



Energy  
Transitions  
Commission

# ETC emerging insights: The role of firm low-carbon power – nuclear and geothermal

ETC Commissioners Meeting  
19 March 2026

















# Agenda

- **Work programme context**

- How ETC's nuclear and geothermal work responds to current debates
- Next steps



# Why are we focusing on nuclear and geothermal now?

Clean power technologies	Previous ETC coverage	Other coverage	Expected clean system role
 <p>Wind and solar</p>	 <p>Clean electrification series</p>		<p>Significant – set to dominate electricity generation</p>
 <p>Hydro (reservoir / run-of-river)</p>	 <p>Not a key focus (mature, geography-limited)</p>		<p>Large existing but limited expansion</p>
 <p>Gas with CCS, hydrogen</p>	 <p>Clean electrification series</p>		<p>Residual / niche</p>
 <p>Bioenergy</p>	 <p>Bioresources</p>		<p>Constrained</p>
 <p>Nuclear</p>	 <p>Minimal focus until now</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Uncertain, potentially material in some regions</li> <li>• Increasing attention: “nuclear renaissance” and “surging next-generation geothermal investments”</li> </ul>
 <p>Geothermal</p>			



**This workstream is the first time the ETC has addressed the future role of nuclear and geothermal in detail**



Source: ASME (2026), Nuclear Energy Outlook for 2026; IEA (2026), Investment in next-generation geothermal is surging. Policies are key to further growth

# The “Firm-low carbon power” workstream is entering final stages



## CONTEXT

- In many regions of the world, **wind and solar will be the most cost-competitive and scalable** new clean electricity generation sources
- But in some places, fast growing demand, limited land availability, or the high cost of balancing the power grid **could make other clean sources attractive.**



## ETC WORKSTREAM WILL EXPLORE

- **What is the role of nuclear and geothermal** electricity in future power systems, alongside wind and solar generation, in different regions of the world?
- Can they be delivered at low cost? Where needed, how can their deployment be scaled faster?

## WORKSHOP SCHEDULE

- Workshop 1 - The role of Nuclear** (2<sup>nd</sup> October 2025)
- Workshop 2 - The role of Geothermal** (3<sup>rd</sup> December 2025)
- Workshop 3 - Key guidelines to scale Nuclear and Geothermal** (23<sup>rd</sup> March 2026)



# Agenda

- Work programme context
- **How ETC's nuclear and geothermal work responds to current debates**
- Next steps



# Key messages

1. **There is growing focus on the potential role of nuclear and geothermal energy**, led by new technology development, rise in power demand from growing users (hyperscalers), and a favourable political environment.
2. **Risks related to supply chains, safety, waste, emissions and resource intensity are real** but, based on international experience, **are small in magnitude and manageable** with appropriate regulation, institutional capacity, and project design.
3. **Life extensions for nuclear should be carried out where they can be done safely**; 20-year extensions could double the remaining size of the existing fleet in 2050
4. **New nuclear and geothermal are likely to remain higher-cost than clean alternatives across most geographies**, with significant regional variation driven by financing, replicable project pipelines, regulation and resource quality; **next-generation technologies are unlikely to materially reduce costs or speed up scale-up in the near term, but may enable location-specific niche applications (e.g. new build heat and power offtake systems).**
5. **Nuclear and geothermal can deliver comparable power system costs to wind- and solar-dominated grids, if deployed at limited shares (e.g. 10–20% generation); certain geothermal applications could deliver system benefits by providing seasonal balancing to offset peak power demand.**
6. **Nuclear and geothermal do not consistently deliver greater economic or societal benefits than other clean technologies**; perceived “higher gross value-add” reflects higher capital intensity rather than superior productivity, and job creation varies significantly by country and supply-chain depth.
7. **Country deployment of nuclear and geothermal technologies should be based on a rigorous assessment of costs, system value constraints, and associated benefits and risks. While these technologies do not meet deployment thresholds in many countries, new nuclear can play a role in specific contexts (e.g. new nuclear in UAE, next-generation geothermal in USA).**

# In the debate, there are seven key viewpoints on nuclear / geothermal

*“Nuclear power should be avoided, because it has security and safety risks that renewables avoid.”*

*“We need nuclear and geothermal because power systems can’t run on renewables”*


*“Nuclear is lower cost than alternatives”*

*“Small modular reactors offer a game-changing route forward for low-carbon power”*

*“We need firm power for data centres and renewables can’t offer this.”*

*“Nuclear delivers high employment prospects and economic growth compared to renewables”*

*“Next generation geothermal will unlock low-cost firm power around the whole world”*



ETC work provides evidence-based perspectives



# 1. Nuclear is unsafe

## Statement

*Nuclear power should be avoided, because it has security and safety risks that renewables avoid*

## Who is making this statement?



**SIERRA CLUB**



Union of Concerned Scientists



Friends of the Earth International



## Key evidence points

- Nuclear safety and proliferation risks are real but can be overstated
- High-level waste disposal is a key challenge that has yet to be fully resolved
- Nuclear can play a complementary role in renewables-dominated systems where institutional capacity exists to manage risks.

**ETC assessment:**

**Overstated**




# Accidents still shape public perceptions, however nuclear is statistically safer than many other electricity generation technologies

## Key safety considerations: nuclear disasters

- **Historical accidents** (Chernobyl, Fukushima) continue to shape public safety perceptions despite high safety standards in recent decades
- **Higher concern in non-nuclear countries; lower in countries with long-standing nuclear programmes and trusted regulatory institutions (e.g. France, Sweden, US, UK, South Korea)**

## Safety by electricity generation type (Our World in Data)

Deaths per TWh (from accidents and air pollution)



- The total death toll (incl. indirect) from the **Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear disasters** are estimated to be **~400 and ~2,300**, respectively
- **Nuclear has a similar overall death rate to wind and solar** (per unit of electricity output)
- **This is due to the stringent regulations and safety standards** that have been developed over decades, which helps to reduce the likelihood of disasters



Notes: Death rates are measured based on deaths from accidents and air pollution per TWh of electricity. Our World in Data's estimates for Chernobyl and Fukushima include direct and cancer deaths from the accidents and indirect deaths from evacuation (stress, displacement from care settings, healthcare disruptions).


Source: Our World in Data (2020), *Death rates per unit of electricity production*, Our World in Data (2017), *What was the death toll from Chernobyl and Fukushima?*

# Careful management is required for high-level nuclear waste; overall safety risks must be managed to maintain social license

## Nuclear waste: low to high radioactivity levels

### There are three different types of nuclear waste

- **Low-level waste (LLW)**, lightly contaminated materials (clothing, filters, and tools)
- **Intermediate-level waste (ILW)**, more radioactive materials (resins, sludges, reactor components).
- **High-level waste (HLW)**, spent nuclear fuel or vitrified reprocessing waste



### France generates the following amounts of waste\* per inhabitant per year:

 **13.8 t**  
of trade waste  
(construction, industry, agriculture, health care activities)

 **354 kg**  
of household waste

 **100 kg**  
of toxic industrial waste

 **2 kg**  
of radioactive waste  
Of this waste:  
60% is from the nuclear industry, and 40% from other sectors

\*Source ADEME (2016)

**Public fear is often disproportionate:** the scientific record shows nuclear waste is small in volume, highly regulated, and safely managed

## 2. Nuclear is lower cost than alternative generation sources

### Statement

*Nuclear is lower cost than alternatives*

### Who is making this statement?



### Key evidence points

- Nuclear has a higher levelised cost of energy than other generation assets in most countries
- Low nuclear costs have been achieved in places with large fleet-based build out programmes
- However, wind and solar are always quicker and cheaper to build

**ETC assessment:**


**Mostly false**



# CAPEX varies significantly by country, largely driven by supply chain readiness / costs

## Recent Generation III overnight CAPEX estimates by country

\$/kW, real 2024




Notes: FOAK = 1<sup>st</sup> of a kind; NOAK = n<sup>th</sup> of a kind. Source: BNEF (2025), LCOE Data Viewer; Energy Technologies Institute (2020), The ETI Nuclear Cost Drivers Project; INL (2024), Nuclear Energy Cost Estimates for Net Zero World Initiative – 2024 Update; Financial Times (2025), Cost of Sizewell C nuclear project expected to reach close to £40bn; Green Prizm (2024), 2023 Report on Chinese Nuclear Power Generation and Costs Analysis

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# “Sunbelt” vs “Windbelt” technology costs divergence is evident for wind and solar, but also nuclear where delivery capability exists

Estimated levelised cost of energy for 2050  
\$/MWh (real 2024\$)



Source: Systemiq analysis for the ETC (2025); BNEF (2025), LCOE: Data Viewer

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### 3. “Power systems need ‘clean firm’ generation sources”

#### Statement

*We need nuclear and geothermal because power systems can't run on high shares of intermittent renewables*

#### Who is making this statement?



CLEARPATH

CLEAN AIR  
TASK FORCE

WORLD NUCLEAR  
ASSOCIATION



#### Key evidence points

- Power systems can run on high shares of intermittent renewables.
- Firm low-carbon power can provide system value, by reducing capacity overbuild, balancing, and grid costs
- Cost, delivery speed, and the declining costs of alternatives will limit it to at most ~10–20% of generation in most geographies.

**ETC assessment:**


**Mostly false**



# It is technically and economically feasible to run low-carbon power systems based primarily on variable renewables


## Weekly balancing for selected November period

GW supply, demand, and balancing for each hour of the period 



## Total system cost estimates, 2050 (min. weather year)

\$/MWh (real 2024\$)



Note: T&D = Transmission and distribution.

Source: Systemiq analysis for the ETC; ETC (2025), *Power Systems Transformation: Delivering Competitive, Resilient Electricity in High-Renewable Systems*; BNEF (2025), LCOE:


Data Viewer

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# Firm low-carbon power provides system value, but cost, delivery speed, and declining costs of alternatives likely limit role to ~10–20% of generation

Illustrative view of components of total system cost and variation by system, UK Case Study in 2050 (minimum weather year)

\$/MWh (real 2024\$)



**System costs consistent at 0-20% nuclear share** → **System costs higher at >20% nuclear share**

## Systems with Firm Low-Carbon...

- **Increase generation costs:** Firm Low-Carbon raises weighted average LCOE
- **Can lower curtailment costs:** need to overbuild generation decreases when Firm Low-Carbon is added
- **Can lower (but not eliminate) balancing costs at low nuclear penetrations:** as ultra-long duration balancing needs fall; as the share of Firm Low-Carbon rises, additional balancing costs occur to manage intra-day mismatches, as lower renewables overbuild reduces the number of hours of naturally concurrent supply and demand
- **Can lower grid stability and T&D costs:** Firm Low-Carbon (particularly nuclear) can provide a wider set of grid stability services than variable renewables

### Key LCOE assumptions (mid):


<b>Offshore wind:</b>	<b>Firm Low-Carbon:</b>
- 2024: \$110/MWh	- 2024: \$170/MWh
- 2050: \$60/MWh	- 2050: \$115/MWh

Notes: "20% nuclear" refers to the share of generation. T&D = Transmission & distribution. Sensitivities: Generation - BNEF's low, medium, and high 2050 CAPEX and OPEX estimates and assumptions for capacity factors, WACC, and lifetimes based on ETC modelling; Curtailment - surplus electricity at the weighted average wind & solar LCOE (assuming no nuclear is curtailed); Balancing - central CAPEX +/- 20% for high/low alongside high/low electricity input costs based on generation; Transmission & distribution - central CAPEX +/- \$5/MWh for high/low. Source: Systemiq analysis for the ETC (2025); BNEF (2025), LCOE Data Viewer




# Considering upcoming retirements of the existing fleet, around 40 GW per year of new reactors will be needed to meet a net-zero pathway

Capacity of existing nuclear fleet by year (assuming 60-year lifetimes)



Capacity needed to meet 10% of 2050 generation in a net-zero pathway (assuming 60-year lifetimes), GW




- Assuming 60-year lifetimes, the existing nuclear fleet capacity will half by 2050 and phase out by 2085
- If all reactors receive life extensions to 80 years, almost all capacity remains online in 2050 and 25% remains in 2080

- ~1,100 GW needed in total by 2050, up from 380 today
- ~950 GW new build needed between now and 2050

# Nuclear could maintain a ~10% share of global generation in 2050 with an ambitious buildout, even as the global power system expands by ~3x

Share of nuclear and geothermal vs other technologies in BNEF's 2050 Net Zero Scenario

%



- ~10% of global generation by 2050 = ~3x today's levels, given demand growth
- Regional shares vary widely (0-25%)
- New nuclear deployment depends on system need, grid requirements, and deliverability constraints

Notes: RoW = rest of world, SEA = Southeast Asia, APAC = Asia-Pacific, MENAT = Middle East and Northern Africa, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa, LATAM = Latin America  
 Source: BNEF (2025), *New Energy Outlook*



## 4. Small modular reactors will be a gamechanger for the role of nuclear

### Statement

*Small modular reactors (SMR) offer a game-changing route forward for low-carbon power*

### Who is making this statement?



SMR



Kairos Power



energy



HITACHI



### Key evidence points

- Most SMR designs lack evidence of sustained, multi-unit pipelines.
- Leading SMR size, cost, and operational characteristics remain closer to large-scale nuclear than to more modular technologies (like solar and wind).

**ETC assessment:**


**Unlikely (in the near-term)**



# SMRs will only deliver low costs if design consolidation and standardisation occurs; this has not been achieved in early SMR deployment


## SMR concepts in development by reactor type

Number of concepts in development



## Projected cost increases for proposed North American SMRs

\$/kW, real 2023



### Key barrier:

- Consolidation is needed to unlock the standardisation and economies of scale that all SMR developers promise
- If nuclear maintains a 10% globally share then we can see a role for fleet SMR commercialisation, which could reduce overall CAPEX by ~20% from initial levels (of over \$10,000/kW)

### SMR vendors in North America have cited an increase in the following factors as cause behind rising costs;


- Inflationary pressures for construction materials
- Higher labour costs
- Increased interest rates
- Supply chain constraints for equipment

Source: IEEFA (2023) Small Modular Reactors; Still Too Expensive, Too Slow and Too Risky; Source: NEA (2025), The NEA Small Modular Reactor Dashboard: Third Edition.

# Nuclear deployment the next decade will be dominated by designs using mature technology, large unit sizes, and standardised designs

Illustrative diagram of the unit size and Commercial Readiness Index (CRI) of selected designs

Unit Size (MWe)



Notes: Circle diameter represents CAPEX scale. CRI 1 = TRL 2-8; CRI 2 = TRL 9. Commercial Gen III+ Reactors include reactors such as AP1000, EPR, APR-1400, HPR-1000. FOAK = first of a kind, NOAK = n<sup>th</sup> of a kind. Source: Systemiq analysis for the ETO (2025); ARENA (2014), Commercial Readiness Index for Renewable Energy Sectors

## 5. Data centres require nuclear or geothermal

### Statement

*We need firm power for data centres and renewables can't offer this*

### Who is making this statement?

amazon

Microsoft

Google

Meta

Goldman Sachs

### Key evidence points

- Data centres could catalyse nuclear and geothermal scale-up in some specific locations (e.g., the US)
- Wind, solar, grids, and dispatchable gas (with declining utilisation) can meet reliability needs at lower cost and faster deployment timelines in many cases.

**ETC assessment:**


**False**



# Corporate power purchase agreements are dominated by wind and solar, however nuclear makes up an increasing share


Global corporate power purchase agreement annual volumes (BNEF)

GW



Top 10 global corporate clean energy buyers in 2025 (BNEF)

GW



- Meta, Amazon, Google and Microsoft accounted for 49% of global PPA activity in 2025
- Nuclear made up 20% of their 2025 PPA capacity




Notes: "Hybrid" refers to co-located combinations of wind, solar, and storage.  
 Source: BNEF (2025), 1H 2026 Corporate Energy Market Outlook: Cooling Off

# Data centre electricity growth is highly uncertain; SMR and next-gen. geothermal viability will depend on large cost reductions

Global data centre annual demand projections by scenario

000 TWh/year



## Key uncertainty drivers

- Computing proliferation
- AI model scaling
- Jevons effect

- Increasing compute efficiency
- Uptake uncertainty
- AI monetisation
- Supply chain grid connection constraints

- **80-300 GW** of dedicated data centre power needed **by 2035**
- **Energy costs are typically ~10% of total data centre costs** so there can be a high willingness to pay for firm power
- **SMR & next-gen. geothermal** contribution requires **undemonstrated cost reductions**


Notes: SMR = small modular reactor GPU = graphics processing unit; PUE = power usage effectiveness; FOAK = first of a kind; NOAK = nth of a kind. TSE conventional data centre cost breakdown used with "Servers & IT hardware" swapped with Bernstein GPU cost estimates. Sources: BNEF (2025), *New Energy Outlook*; IEA (2025), *Energy and AI*; Thunder Said Energy (2025), *AI energy: industrial demand and the Jevons effect?*; Thunder Said Energy (2025), *Data-centers: the economics?*; Investing.com (2025), *How much does a GW of data center capacity actually cost*

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# Nuclear and geothermal are unlikely to provide sufficient short-term capacity for data centre demand, due to long lead times

Average durations from final investment decision to commissioning over time

Years



Average nuclear construction times have increased significantly, particularly in the West


New nuclear could add 1,000 TWh in the next 10 years while solar will add 10,000 TWh



Sources: Adapted from Mycle Schneider Consulting (2024), *The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2024*; Financial Times (2025), *Can the nuclear industry find a better way to build?*; A. Gumber (2024), *A global analysis of renewable energy project commissioning timelines*; British Geological Survey (2023), *Evidence report supporting the deep geothermal energy white paper: The case for deep geothermal energy - unlocking investment at scale in the UK*

# Renewables and storage are increasingly offering 24/7 clean power solutions across the “Windbelt” and the “Sunbelt”

Optimal renewables and storage system configuration to meet continuous baseload demand varies by region



**UK – “Windbelt” solution**  
*Centre for Net Zero modelling (2025)*

- ~80% renewables (offshore wind + solar + BESS), ~20% gas
- 120 MW, 24/7 with COD 2028-30
- 43% cheaper than nuclear SMR
- 23% cheaper than gas-only

**Implied LCOE: ~\$90/MWh**

**Abu Dhabi – “Sunbelt” solution**  
*Masdar / EWEC (under construction)*

- 5.2 GW solar PV + 19 GWh battery
- Delivers 1 GW baseload, 24/7
- ~\$6bn investment, online ~2027
- Zero gas backup required

**Implied LCOE: ~\$55/MWh**

**Recent Nuclear LCOEs**

UK	UAE
\$170/MWh	\$75/MWh

Note: Both scenarios assume 100% load-matching, however reliability statistics are not provided. Abu Dhabi LCOE is an illustrative estimate based on published capex of ~\$6bn (AED 22bn), 30-year project life, 5% WACC, 1.5% annual O&M, and one battery replacement. Actual tariff not yet disclosed. UK figures derived from CNZ published annual costs (medium DESNZ cost assumptions). Source: PV Magazine (2025), Masdar, EWEC announce 5 GW/19 GWh solar-plus-storage project in Abu Dhabi; Centre for Net Zero (2025), *How to accelerate the UK’s AI revolution – Powering data centres at speed and low cost*



## 6. Nuclear delivers high employment prospects and economic growth

### Statement

*Nuclear delivers high employment prospects and economic growth compared to renewables*

### Who is making this statement?



### Key evidence points

- While nuclear projects can deliver high local employment during construction, this is driven by their high cost rather than capital efficiency.
- Long-term employment and gross value add are comparable to other clean generation technologies.


**ETC assessment:**

**Overstated**



# Value added conundrum: nuclear can deliver high employment and local economic benefits vs renewables because of its high cost and complexity

Nuclear gross value add (GVA) conundrum:



The same factors driving nuclear's high cost, complex, labour-intensive construction, are what generate outsized domestic economic benefits



# 7. Next-generation geothermal will be a gamechanger for the role of geothermal

## Statement

*Next-generation geothermal will unlock low-cost firm power around the whole world*

## Who is making this statement?



## Key evidence points


- Countries with the best resource and supply chains (incl. the US) have a near-term opportunity to commercialise next-generation geothermal
- However, significant technical, cost, and scalability risks remain

**ETC assessment:**

**Uncertain**




# Next-generation geothermal is deeper, hotter, and lower maturity than conventional geothermal options



Notes: Underground energy storage parameters refer to underground thermal energy storage (excluding more nascent options such as geothermal mechanical storage). Assumed TRL scale: TRL 1-3 = Research to Proof of Concept; TRL 4-6 = Lab to Pilot Demonstration; TRL 7-9 = Prototype Demonstration to FOAK / Full Commercial Deployment

# Next-generation geothermal power project development is expanding, with activity concentrated in North America, Europe, and APAC

## Global geothermal project deployment map




Notes: APAC = Asia-Pacific. Shaded thermal regions indicate broad geothermal gradients, not specific next-generation resource requirements.

Sources: Clean Air Task Force (2025), The Next Generation of Geothermal Energy. Available at: <https://www.caff.us/shr-map/>

# Next-generation geothermal costs vary widely depending on geology; they are driven by depth, temperature gradient, and financing risk

## Illustrative EGS cost variation by depth and temperature (2035 costs, constant WACC)

Depth below surface – m; heatmap LCOE – \$/MWh, real 2024



- **Shallower, hotter sites deliver the lowest cost:** LCOE drops sharply where high temperature gradients allow production at <3 km depth
- **Most of the world sits in the 15-45 °C/km range,** requiring deeper drilling and pushing LCOE estimates above \$80/MWh at 2035 costs
- **Reducing development and operational risk is critical** to lowering WACC, which would shift LCOEs downward

Typical temperature gradients by region:

<p><b>Low gradients: 15-30 °C/km</b> E.g., UK, Eastern US, Central/Eastern Europe, Brazil</p>	<p><b>Moderate gradients: 30-45 °C/km</b> E.g., Australia, Northern India, Northwest Africa, Northern Canada, Southwest UK</p>	<p><b>High gradients: 45-100+ °C/km</b> E.g., East African Rift, Iceland, Western US, New Zealand, Indonesia, Philippines, Central Andes (Chile, Bolivia, Argentina)</p>
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Notes: EGS = enhanced geothermal systems, WACC = weighted average cost of capital, LCOE = levelised cost of energy. Source: Systemiq analysis for the ETC (2025); NREL (2025), 2025 Geothermal Drilling Cost Curves Update; Koenraad F. Beckers (2019), GEOPHIRES v2.0: updated geothermal techno-economic simulation tool; US DoE (2024) Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Next-Generation Geothermal Power Updated; F. Kolawole (2023), Global distribution of geothermal gradients in sedimentary basins; J. Limberger (2017), Geothermal energy in deep aquifers: A global assessment of the resource base for direct heat utilization


# Agenda

- Work programme context
- How ETC's nuclear and geothermal work responds to current debates
- **Next steps**



# We propose a joint report covering both nuclear and geothermal

## Role of nuclear and geothermal in low-carbon power systems (~60 p)



Notes:  is relevant for nuclear;  is relevant for geothermal

# Next steps



**Workshop 3 - Key guidelines to scale nuclear and geothermal**

*23 March 2026*



**Report drafting with member reviews**

*April – May 2026*



**Report publication and communications campaign**

*Summer 2026 onwards*



# Discussion

